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R. Greg Bell, University of Dallas 
Abdul A. Rasheed, University of Texas at Arlington 
 
ABSTRACT 
The integration of international capital markets makes it easier for firms to access capital outside 
of their home countries. To date international business (IB) scholars have developed a rich 
tradition of research on how globalization of product markets may affect a firm’s organizational 
form and business strategy. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of studies that explore the 
challenges firms face in capital markets beyond their domestic boundaries, be it equity, debt, or 
venture capital markets. The objective of this Special Issue is to address these theoretical and 
empirical gaps in prior IB studies. This paper outlines the main differences between product and 
capital markets, and explores theoretical and empirical challenges these differences present for 
international management scholars. We also provide a brief summary of papers in the Special 
Issue and outline promising avenues for future research. 
 
1. Introduction 
The increasing integration of global capital markets now makes it easier for firms to 
access capital outside of their home countries. Firms access international capital markets through 
a variety of means such as initial public offerings (IPO), seasoned equity offerings (SEO), cross-
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listings, depository receipts, special purpose acquisition companies (SPACS), shelf offerings, 
private equity and other informal equity capital channels.   Firms can also access debt resources 
outside their market through bank loans, and foreign bond issues. For example, foreign firms 
raise significantly more debt than equity in the U.S.  Indeed, the largest component of the 
international capital market is the bond market (Lau and Yu, 2009). Finally, cross border flows 
of venture capital (VC) continue to increase rapidly (Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). Venture 
capital and private equity have truly become global phenomena and take many forms such as 
cross-border investment, foreign acquisitions, VC firms opening offices overseas, and 
influencing their portfolio firms to enter and exit international stock exchanges. Further, other 
global investors such as Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) manage large portfolios that are 
diversified not only with regard to different asset classes but also across many nations and 
geographies.  
Research on the motivation, the processes, the supporting mechanisms, and the diverse 
range of outcomes that firms experience as a result of entering international capital markets is 
extremely limited so far. We believe such research can draw from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives and research traditions in international business.  The choice of whether to access 
financial resources outside of the firm’s home market, how to select the appropriate foreign 
market, and the manner in which to raise resources, are all relevant questions that parallel prior 
international business (IB) research on market and entry mode choice (Datta, Hermann and 
Rasheed, 2002; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).   
While IB research continues to evaluate the challenges facing firms in foreign product 
markets, scholars have yet to adequately address the underlying reasons why firms face 
challenges in foreign equity markets. These include share underpricing, higher underwriting and 
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professional fees, higher listing fees, audit fees (Bronson, Ghosh, and Hogan, 2009), greater risk 
of lawsuits (Bhattacharya, Galpin, and Haslem, 2007), and home bias on the part of investors 
(French and Poterba, 1991). Further, research suggests the existence of a “foreign firm discount” 
relative to host market firms (Frésard and Salva, 2010).  IB scholars consider liability of 
foreignness (LOF) as the “fundamental assumption driving theories of the multinational 
enterprise” (Zaheer, 1995: 341). Yet, the conceptualization and research on LOF solely based 
upon product market may be inadequate today given the increasing integration of capital markets 
(Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed, 2012).   
Although IB scholars have developed a rich tradition of research on how globalization of 
product markets may affect a firm’s organizational form and business strategy, there is a paucity 
of studies that explore the challenges firms face in capital markets beyond their domestic 
boundaries, be it equity, debt, or VC markets. The objective of this Special Issue is to address 
these theoretical and empirical gaps in prior IB studies. In this Introduction article, we first 
outline the main differences between product and capital markets, and then explore the 
theoretical and empirical challenges these differences present for international management 
scholars. We also provide a brief summary of papers in the Special Issue and discuss promising 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. Differences between product and capital markets 
As Bell et al. (2012) pointed out, factor markets, including capital markets, have 
distinctively different characteristics compared to product markets, and this may have profound 
implications in terms of theory building related to the globalization of capital markets.  While a 
full elaboration of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper, the most significant 
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differences are in terms of information production, types of goods traded, the nature of the 
ongoing linkage between the firm and the buyer, information intensity, information frictions, and 
sources of arbitrage.  Table 1 provides a summary of these differences.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
First, the information production environments differ between product and capital 
markets.  Capital markets can be largely considered as mediated markets (Pollock, Porac, and 
Wade, 2004) in the sense that participants rely greatly upon key third parties, such as investment 
banks, brokers, and investment analysts for information production.  Indeed, intermediation is a 
necessary and inevitable response to costly market imperfections (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980).  
Second, product markets involve the trading of consumption goods, whereas capital markets 
engage in the buying and selling of investment and debt products.  Over time, most consumption 
goods typically tend to depreciate in value.  In contrast, the expectation for investment products 
is that they will appreciate in value.  While the seller’s reputation is important in both product 
and capital markets, the expectations that reputation produces in the buyers’ mind are 
significantly different.  In product markets, buyers associate reputation with the quality and 
durability of goods.  Investors in stocks, bonds and other capital market instruments, however, 
associate issuers’ reputation with expectations about streams of future dividend and interest 
payments in addition to potential appreciation of the value of their investments over time.    
 Product and capital markets also differ in terms of linkages and connections between 
buyers and sellers.  In the case of product markets, although the relationship between a buyer and 
seller may influence a purchase decision, once the purchase is completed the buyer’s focus is 
mostly on the product itself and the utility one derives from it rather than the producer.  In 
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contrast, the connections between the issuers and buyers of capital market securities continue 
long after the transaction.  For example, equities represent residual claim rights that are 
enforceable as long as the firm exists.  Similarly, debt instruments involve scheduled payments 
of interest and loan principal over a specified period of time.  The underlying value of the 
securities that an investor holds is affected positively or negatively on an ongoing basis by the 
actions and decisions of the issuer.   Yet another difference between product and capital markets 
is in terms of information intensity.  In product markets information collection by the buyer is 
mostly a one-time effort that occurs prior to the purchase.  In comparison, capital markets are far 
more information intensive.  Information collection is an ongoing activity that occurs both before 
and after the purchase.  The prices of capital market instruments constantly change reflecting 
new information that becomes available.  The behavior of the investors in terms of their decision 
to buy, hold, or sell are affected by the availability of information or lack thereof. 
 Further, capital markets are characterized by frictions that are diverse and widespread, 
affecting virtually every transaction in some way, although finance theory traditionally assumes 
it away.  By friction we mean anything that interferes with trade.  The major types of frictions 
include transactions costs, taxes and regulations, asset indivisibility, and agency and information 
problems (DeGennaro, 2005).  Each generates real costs for investors and causes them to deviate 
from theoretically optimal behavior.  Although product markets also have frictions, their sources 
are very different.  For example, costs stemming from transportation and storage are two of the 
main sources of product market frictions.  Finally, trading in product markets essentially involve 
arbitrage in space, whereas trading in capital markets involves arbitrage in time.  This brief 
account of differences between product and capital markets, although far from being exhaustive, 
clearly points out that theories and frameworks that IB scholars have developed to study the 
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process of globalization and its consequences for individual firms, cannot be directly applied 
when one considers internationalization of capital markets.  
 
3. Implications of differences between product and capital markets for key theoretical 
frameworks 
Given the significant differences between product and factor markets, it is not surprising 
that researchers have different theoretical foci when applying mainstream theories to these two 
distinctive contexts, such as agency and institutional theories, resource-dependency framework 
and transaction cost economics (TCE). Table 2 provides a brief summary of these differences. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
As Buckley and Strange (2011) argue in their review article, internalization theory is a 
key theoretical framework that underpins many IB studies of internationalization in product 
markets. Internalization theory is rooted in the work of Coase (1937), who sought to explain the 
existence of the firm as an institution, and why the firm came to supersede the market. Coase 
(1937) argued that there were transaction costs in effecting exchanges through the market, and 
that the firm would emerge if the costs associated with organizing these exchanges within the 
firm were lower. Such costs included inter alia those concerned with defining property rights, 
and those associated with the formulation, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts 
(Buckley and Strange, 2011). Internalization theory (Hymer, 1968; Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Rugman, 1981; Tomassen, Benito, and Lunnan, 2012) emphasizes the relative costs and benefits 
of coordinating related economic activities internally by the management of a firm rather than 
externally through the market (Buckley and Strange, 2011). A parallel literature has focused on 
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the theory of the domestic firm, and has given rise to the transaction costs economics (TCE) 
paradigm in which the works of Williamson (1985) and Klein et al (1978) have been particularly 
influential. Both view the firm, domestic or MNE, as an alternative governance structure to the 
market. And both focus on crafting governance structures which economize on the ex post 
transaction costs of coordinating the activities of the various parties. 
When the TCE framework is applied to capital markets the focus is not on how firms can 
minimize costs associated with production and distribution on global product markets but rather 
with how firms can minimize costs related to the acquisition of production factors such as 
capital, that are available globally. Such issues as selecting foreign stock exchanges for the 
firm’s equity, foreign buyers of the firm’s debt, and achieving high level of liquidity of its 
financial assets overseas have become focal points of TCE-grounded studies of global capital 
markets. 
 The two main theoretical approaches to international diversification – resource-
dependency theory (RDT) and the resource-based view (RBV) - assume that the most efficient 
firm strategy will be that which maximizes the rents from the firm-specific assets and thus 
maximizes the long-run value of the firm (Buckley and Strange, 2011). The role of management 
in such theories is essentially to identify and implement this efficient strategy. The RDT 
perspective extends these arguments further and suggests that a successful internationalization 
strategy should also aim at minimizing the firm’s dependency on external transactional parties 
such as suppliers of key inputs and buyers of the firm’s products.  The IB research on capital 
markets adds new dimensions to this analysis by focusing on how firms can take advantage of 
global capital markets to minimize its dependency on local capital providers.  
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 Agency theory is the field where differences in theoretical approaches to product and 
capital markets are particularly acute. In the context of corporate governance research, 
Filatotchev and Wright (2011) indicate that since degree of internationalization of the firm’s 
product markets is an important determinant of the complexity it faces, the firm’s strategy will 
depend on its ability to deal with information asymmetries and the potential agency conflicts 
associated with overseas ventures. Different risk preferences of managers and shareholders may 
lead to differences in their strategic objectives, leading to a need for a complex governance 
contract to align their interests rather than governance structures that solely focus on minimizing 
the costs of effecting a transaction. In the context of firms tapping international capital markets, 
however, theoretical emphasis shifts towards information asymmetries between the firm and its 
overseas investors, and possible agency problems associated with adverse selection in the 
context of valuations of the firm’s assets. 
 Institutional theory has been widely deployed in both product and capital market studies, 
but here too we find a number of subtle differences in theoretical emphasis and focus. Studies of 
international product market diversification build on the observation that successful international 
expansion must be associated with at least some type of non-location bound firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs). These are FSAs that can be transferred, deployed and exploited across 
borders. However, this transfer may be materially affected by institutional and cultural 
differences between the firm’s home and host countries. Sociological and institutional 
perspectives on financial market behavior suggests an alternative theoretical approach to the role 
of macro-institutions by arguing that capital market reactions to firm-level financing strategies 
are institutionally embedded (Bell, et al., 2014; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). From this 
perspective, market perceptions of the firm’s actions are an outcome of investors’ perceptions of 
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its legitimacy rather than rational, efficiency-centered investor decisions (Filatotchev, Chahine 
and Bruton, 2016). Legitimacy is the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Thus, in the setting of uncertainty 
associated with the process of capital raising, investors tend to focus on institutionalized rules 
(also called institutional logics) when evaluating the quality of financial products offered by 
firms (Pollock, Fund, and Baker, 2009). These rules are formed by macro-institutions that frame 
the process of investor assessment of the firm.  
 Given imperfect information and limited information processing capacity, IB studies in 
the product market domain based on the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm are focused 
on the need to deal with problems associated with bounded rationality (or ‘scarcity of mind’, 
Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016). For example, lower compounded distance, suggests greater intra-
regional similarities. This extends to similiarities among country environments and similiarities 
among the configurations of firm-level activity sets conducted in the relevant countries. These 
similiarities function to reduce spatial transaction costs, and foster a home-region strategy 
approach (Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016).  Scholars suggest that these similarities could be in the 
form of regulatory commonalities at the institutional level, or similar quasi-identical firm level 
activities (e.g. human resource management practices, customer service activities) (Verbeke and 
Asmussen, 2016). As a result, bounded reliability (or ‘scarcity of making good on open ended 
promises’) challenges inside the home region can also be substantially reduced vis-à-vis outsider 
regions (Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016).  Firms adopting established and widely accepted 
routines and heuristics when making decisions can also be much more effective than in high 
compounded-distance environments (Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016).  
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The fundamental differences between product and capital markets shift focus of KBV 
towards exploring liability of foreignness in the capital market context, referred to as CMLOF  
(Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012)   Increasing evidence suggesting the existence of LOF in 
capital markets comes from a body of research in finance that demonstrates that investors in both 
developed and developing markets strongly prefer to invest in domestic firms rather than foreign 
firms in capital markets (Ke, Ng, and Wang, 2010).  This "home bias puzzle", first documented 
by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) is one of the major research 
questions in international finance and economics (for a review see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).  
The existence of home bias in finance markets clearly suggests that foreign firms face 
disadvantages while trying to access resources in foreign capital markets, compared to local 
firms.  Research in IB has long recognized that firms face liabilities of foreignness when 
competing abroad (Denk, Kaufmann, and Roesch, 2012; Maruyama and Wu, 2015;  Newburry, 
Gardberg, and Sanchez, 2014). However, IB research has been slow to provide a comprehensive 
theoretical explanation for the disadvantages that firms face in foreign capital markets, or to offer 
solutions that firms can use to overcome them.  
To summarize, capital and product markets differ significantly in terms of information 
environment, time structure of transactions, and linkages between buyers and sellers, which 
suggests that the process of internationalization and its impact on individual firms in the two 
markets may be different. Further, if there are indeed fundamental differences in the sources of 
LOF between product and capital markets, then researchers need to re-think possible solutions 
foreign firms may deploy to minimize these liabilities.  To address these theoretical challenges, 
we also need to re-consider our applications of key research frameworks that have been widely 
used in IB research, including TCE, RBV/RDT and institutional theory. In the following 
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sections, we outline a few key areas for research that may extend the existing boundaries of 
studies on globalization and its impact on the firm’s strategy. 
 
4. Directions for research on the strategic implications of the globalization of capital 
markets 
The firm-level implications of the globalization of capital markets present IB researchers 
with a number of avenues for exciting research in the years to come.  In this section we identify a 
select set of research opportunities that seem most promising. We suggest that key research 
frameworks that have been widely used in IB research, including TCE, RBV, RDT and 
institutional theory, which we discuss in the prior section, should be considered as potential 
lenses to evaluate these areas of future research. The topics we have identified are by no means 
exhaustive. However, we hope it would help develop an understanding of the range and richness 
of research issues that remain to be explored. 
4.1 Interactions between product and capital markets 
Research in finance area suggests there are information spillovers from product markets 
to capital markets.  This may have implications for both TCE and RBV theory building. In terms 
of empirical evidence, Kent and Allen (1994) indicate that high brand recognition serves as a 
focal point for information about companies.  Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) found that 
individual investors prefer to invest in stocks with easily recognized products.  Grullon, Kanatas 
and Weston (2004) found that a firm’s advertising expenditures and thus its overall visibility 
leads to a greater number of both individual and institutional investors as well as better liquidity 
for their common stock.  Chemmanur and Yan (2010) found that a firm going public with a 
greater extent of advertising in its IPO year is valued higher both in the IPO as well as in the 
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immediate market.  Another recent study by Keloharju, Knupfer and Linnainmaa (2012) found 
that investors are more likely to purchase and less likely to sell shares of companies they 
frequent as customers.  Based on data from brokerage and automotive industries, they report a 
strong positive relationship between customer relationship, ownership of a company, and size of 
ownership stake.  
From the TCE perspective, one possible explanation for these observed interactions 
between product and capital markets is that individuals use simple rules of thumb when making 
decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and 
that information about the brand and familiarity with the product are equated as information 
about the securities.  The possibility of interaction between product and capital markets has been 
demonstrated in the international context as well.  A number of studies show that greater trade 
between two countries results in increased cross-border asset holdings (Heathcote and Perri, 
2004; Portes and Rey, 2005; Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; and Lane and Milesi-Feretti, 2004).  
While the above studies demonstrate the spill-over from product markets to capital markets, such 
spill-over is, by no means, unidirectional.  Research by Sarkissian and Schill (2004) shows that 
firms raise capital in countries where their products are known.  They found that “trade has an 
important effect, in that firms that are relatively more familiar to foreign investors before the 
listing benefit more by the listing” (p.4).   Singh, Faircloth and Nejadmalayeri (2005) found that 
higher advertising expenditures lead to lower cost of capital and thus higher performance.  Peress 
(2010) suggested that because products trade in imperfect markets and equity shares in perfect 
markets, firms are able to use their monopoly power to insulate their profits which in turn 
encourages stock trading and improves allocation of capital. 
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On the other hand, cross-listing can have multiple benefits, including bolstering the 
firm’s competitive position in its industry, as well as heightening the  firm’s brand recognition, 
and reputation with suppliers, employees, and customers (Pagano et al., 2002).  This adds new 
interesting dimensions to the analysis of firm resources and related competitive advantages 
within the context of RBV. Fanto and Karmel (1997) report that managers of foreign companies 
cite industry-specific reasons as the main motivations for U.S. listing.  That is, firms may decide 
to raise capital abroad so that their products can become better known in foreign markets. Thus, 
the choice to list abroad, as Bancel and Mittoo (2001) suggest, maybe an important aspect of the 
global business strategy of firms.  
Although the research on the interactions between product and capital markets is still in 
its early stages, it provides several important insights.  First, it is clear that managers view 
product and capital markets as linked and they actively try to take advantage of these linkages by 
reducing information costs of transactions.  Second, consumers of products and services are also 
investors in stocks and therefore this interconnectedness exists in their minds as well providing a 
new perspective on the context of firm resources.  Third, there exists a two-way relationship 
between firms’ product and capital market strategies.  Therefore, differences between product 
and capital markets, as well as their inter-connectedness, provide a foundation for further theory 
building within the context of TCE and RDT as indicated in Table 2. 
Although disciplinary boundaries have separated product and capital market strategies 
into distinct silos, it is encouraging to see that researchers in marketing and finance are becoming 
increasingly interested in the multiple ways in which the two markets interact.  The increasing 
integration of global capital and product markets challenges IB researchers to further explore the 
implications of these interactions. 
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4.2 Stock exchange competition and listing choice 
Leading stock exchanges around the world are engaged in fierce competition to attract 
more foreign firms to list with them.  Such competition has made it easier for firms to make a 
choice among multiple exchanges.   Not only are more and more countries establishing stock 
exchanges (Weber, Davis and Lounsbury, 2009), they are also trying to attract foreign firms to 
list with them.  Today there are fewer technical barriers to trading in newer exchanges. Also, the 
securities markets are considerably more liberal. As a result, national stock exchanges do not 
maintain the monopoly advantages that they have historically enjoyed.  
Competition among stock markets may have interesting implications for both stock 
markets themselves and for firms deciding to list with them.  One of the explanations for cross-
listing from the TCE perspective (Table 2) has been that it enables firm to overcome market 
segmentation and tap into trapped pools of liquidity in distant markets (Coffee, 2002).  This 
explanation is no longer considered valid because capital can reach any market in an era of 
globalization of capital markets.  Instead, “bonding” seems to be a superior explanation.  That is, 
firms list in an exchange with higher disclosure standards, better private and public monitoring, 
and stronger enforcement than their home-country capital markets in order to signal better 
governance.  However, this explanation leaves us with a number of questions.  First, if bonding 
is the main driver of foreign listings, why is it that many countries are establishing alternative 
exchanges with lower disclosure requirements?  Second, if foreign listing through bonding 
results in higher valuation and lower cost of capital, why is it that only a small percentage of 
firms actually do so?  Coffee (2002) offers an interesting explanation for the second question.  
He argues that cross-listing firms have higher growth prospects than firms who do not list abroad 
and are hence seeking more capital even if it comes at the cost of some of the private benefits of 
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control.   Thus differences in the need for capital and control may result in the continued 
existence of specialized markets to accommodate both types of firms.   Third, what prevents 
public companies from seeking exchanges with the lowest disclosure standards and minority 
shareholder protection?  Theoretically at least, it seems possible that while some firms may 
indeed be engaging in bonding, others may be doing exactly the opposite.  Each of these 
questions requires further investigation which may extend boundaries of TCE-grounded 
research. 
Heightened competition among stock exchanges has elevated decisions about which 
markets to enter and the choice of entry mode to be one of the most important decisions that 
managers seeking equity or debt resources can make.  Market choice and entry mode choice are 
just as important in capital markets as they are in product markets.  Given the increasing choices 
a firm has among capital markets around the world and the multiple types of equity and debt 
instruments that are available to them, managers are faced with complex decision making 
situations.  To argue that firms are merely trying to minimize the cost of capital from the TCE 
perspective is an oversimplification that provides very little understanding about this important 
strategic choice.  In one of the first studies that examined capital market choice decisions, 
Pagano, Randl, Roell and Zechner (2001) found that European companies are more likely to 
cross-list in more liquid and larger markets, and in markets where several companies from their 
industry are already cross-listed. They are also more likely to cross-list in countries with better 
investor protection, and more efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent 
accounting standards.  Moore, Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed (2012) advanced a comparative 
institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign 
market. By integrating agency framework with institutional theory, they found that internal 
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governance characteristics and external network characteristics are significant predictors of 
foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.  Their results suggest that foreign IPO firms 
select a host market where the firms’ governance characteristics and third party affiliations fit the 
host market’s institutional environment.  Gao (2011) found that foreign firms rely less on the 
U.S. public bond market after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This suggests that 
a country’s regulatory environment can have a significant impact on market choice by firms. 
In the context of RBV, the array of choices that a firm has with respect to a “mode of 
entry” is significantly greater in capital markets compared to product markets.  The primary 
choice is, of course, between debt and equity.  However, within each of these categories, there 
are a multiplicity of alternatives.  Within equity, important alternatives include foreign IPO, 
cross-listings, and depository receipts.  In the debt market, choices include foreign bonds, 
Eurobonds, bank credit, and convertible bonds.  Private capital of various kinds is also becoming 
increasingly important.  The wide variety of alternative modes of entry underscores the need for 
capital market researchers to embark on a research trajectory that parallels the efforts made by 
product market researchers in the last thirty years.  
There are a number of important research questions that require examination regarding 
the choice of mode of entry into a capital market.  First, does the choice of market to enter 
determine mode of entry or does the causality work in the opposite direction?  It is entirely 
possible that these decisions are neither independent nor sequential.  It is equally likely that they 
evolve jointly.  Second, decisions by individual firms may not be independent of decisions made 
by other firms.  There may indeed be considerable isomorphism in the behavior of firms and 
later entrants are likely to follow what earlier entrants did.  Third, one type of entry does not 
preclude other modes of entering the market subsequently.  For example, Ball, Hall, and Vasvari 
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(2010) found that firms raise debt capital more frequently and issue fewer syndicated loans 
following an equity cross-listing.  The internationalization theory originally advanced by the 
Uppsala school (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) suggests that firms follow a stage model as they 
learn from low commitment entries and use this knowledge to increase their commitment at the 
subsequent stages.  That is, the KBV perspective suggests that they start with low-involvement 
modes and incrementally move to higher involvement modes.  A reasonable, KBV-grounded 
argument is possible that such behavior is likely in the capital markets as well, especially in the 
context of LOF in capital markets (Table 2).  An initial equity listing, for example, may be a 
prelude to subsequent seasoned equity offerings, as the firm’s LOF gradually declines.  A 
longitudinal examination of the sequence in which a firm makes multiple attempts to tap into a 
foreign capital market and the determinants of this sequence represent an avenue for further 
research. 
4.3 Corporate governance and capital market integration  
The increasing integration of capital markets has profound implications for corporate 
governance research in general, and agency perspective outlined in Table 2 in particular. One 
argument is that the huge flows of capital, both debt and equity, across borders can bring about 
convergence in governance practices through the fundamental transformation in the ownership 
structure of corporations that result from such flows.  The convergence thesis was originally 
presented by Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) who argued that convergence of governance 
practices of public corporations around the world is inevitable and that they will converge 
towards the Anglo-American model of shareholder value maximization.  Some authors go so far 
as to suggest that the integration of financial markets is the primary driver of convergence of 
governance practices (Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Nestor and Thompson, 2000).  
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There are multiple mechanisms through which integration of capital markets can result in 
governance convergence (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009).  First, foreign listing may be a means 
by which firms from countries with lower disclosure standards and minority shareholder 
protection  are bonding to the higher standards expected in foreign stock exchanges.  There is no 
evidence that the presence of significant regulatory and compliance costs associated with cross-
listing have discouraged the flow of foreign equity listings (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995).  
Instead, there has been a significant increase in the number of firms that altogether forego their 
domestic equity markets and make their first issue of equity in New York or London 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006). Although, on the surface, it would seem that firms would be 
motivated to list in countries with the least demanding regulatory requirements resulting in a 
‘race to the bottom’, the observed pattern, however, is exactly the opposite (Coffee, 2002). Thus, 
entry into foreign capital markets, either through cross-listing or IPOs, can potentially result in 
convergence as a byproduct.  Second, the fear that flight of domestic firms into foreign 
exchanges may drain their exchanges of liquidity can cause national exchanges to create higher 
disclosure standards.  
National governments may also try to pass legislation requiring higher levels of minority 
protection in order to stem migration of local firms to foreign exchanges.  These steps can also 
lead to greater convergence in governance practices.  Third, there has been a substantial increase 
in foreign portfolio investment in most regions of the world (Useem, 1998). Foreign investors 
typically own relatively small stakes and trade their shares frequently (Davis and Steil, 2001).  
Most firms find it desirable to attract foreign institutional investors because the resulting demand 
for the stock can drive up stock prices and increase firm valuation. However, it is not possible to 
attract foreign investors without complying with their expectations of good governance in 
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matters such as disclosure and respect for the rights of minority shareholders. The only way to 
attract and retain foreign investors is to live up to their expectations of good governance (David, 
Yoshikawa, Chari, and Rasheed, 2006).  Finally, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Yildiz, 
2014. Yang and Hyland, 2012) are yet another mechanism that can potentially lead to 
convergence.  Listing in a foreign exchange may often be the prelude to acquiring firms in that 
country through stock swaps. When a firm from one country is acquiring a firm from another 
country, it is inevitable that the new entity will exhibit at least some of the governance 
characteristics of its country of origin.  This, in turn, leads to increasing convergence in 
governance practices.  
4.4 Sovereign wealth funds   
The growing importance of new types of investors, including sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs), adds new dimensions to research on the governance roles of global investors in general, 
and agency research in particular, as we indicated in Table 2. Although SWFs have been around 
for a long time, in recent years we have seen an unprecedented growth both in terms of their 
scale and scope.  SWFs differ from traditional investment funds in a number of ways including 
their ownership, strategic objectives, time horizon, capacity to bear risk, and transparency.  There 
is, however, very little research on SWFs (Butt, Shivdasani and Wyman, 2008; Knill, Lee and 
Mauck, 2012) and even less on their effects at the firm level.  The very fact that these funds are 
owned by governments introduces a political dimension to investment decisions unlike in the 
case of traditional investment funds.  Given that a substantial amount of the investment of SWFs 
take place outside the home country, international relations also play a part in investment 
decisions.  Because governments are not under pressure to show short term returns, these funds 
can have very long time horizons.  Many of the investments may have strategic objectives which 
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are far more important for the government than immediate financial returns such as control over 
scarce raw materials, access to emerging technologies, or desire to change the structure of an 
industry.  There are also security and strategic implications that stem from foreign government 
control of important sectors of a country’s economy.  Traditionally, researchers have viewed 
governments and markets as distinct entities but when governments begin to play such an 
important role in the market as a critical resource provider, it has significant implications for firm 
strategies and outcomes.  The activities of SWFs are also less subject to public scrutiny because 
of limited disclosure requirements and because of their ability to channel their investments 
through intermediate investment vehicles.  The investment choices of SWFs, strategies followed 
by firms to either attract or deter investment by SWFs, and the longer term strategic, financial, 
and governance consequences at the firm level resulting from this new type of capital presents a 
fertile area for future research. 
4.5 Culture and capital markets 
There has been increasing recognition in recent years, in particular within the context of 
neo-institutional research, that culture affects both economic exchange and outcomes by 
affecting expectations and preferences.  A new stream of literature in economics, for example, 
has been examining the effect of culture on economic and political outcomes (Alesina, and 
Giuliano, 2013; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009; Tabellini, 2010; Ahern, Daminelli, and 
Fracassi, 2015).  Culture can affect economic behavior through mechanisms such as trust or by 
being part of the overall concept of distance.  Because culture plays an important role in 
economic exchange, it is only natural that cultural differences between countries will have a 
significant impact on a wide variety of cross-border economic transactions.     
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Few concepts in international business have attracted as much application in diverse areas 
of research as cultural distance (Hofstede; 1980; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Sousa and Bradley, 
2006). While the impact of cultural difference on the activities of individuals and firms has 
received considerable research attention, the role of culture is increasingly being recognized for 
its influence on investor behavior.  Research evidence also suggests that culture affects capital 
market decisions by firms in equity and debt markets as well as in informal capital markets. 
These arguments provide novel dimensions to the institutional perspective in IB research by 
suggesting that capital market strategies may be framed not only by underlying efficiency 
models but also by differences in cultural, macro-institutional factors that underpin institutional 
logics in different capital markets (Filatotchev et al., 2016) as indicated in Table 2. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell 
the stocks of firms that are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor’s 
native tongue, and have chief executives of the same cultural background.  Similar results have 
been reported in a number of subsequent studies.   Morse and Shive (2007), for example, found 
that cultures with high levels of patriotism have larger proportion of their investments allocated 
at home.  Anderson et al. (2011: 930) found that “culture impacts investor behavior directly” 
even after controlling for geographical distance and regulatory differences. Chui, Titman, and 
Wei (2010) found that cross-cultural differences in terms of individualism versus collectivism 
are related to trading activity levels and security pricing across countries.  Further evidence of 
culture’s impact on investor behavior is provided by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) who find that 
societies with higher levels of individualism invest more in foreign equities and that more 
uncertainty avoiding societies are associated with lower levels of foreign equity investment.  
Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) find that when a country is more remote from the rest of the world 
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and has a different language, foreign investors are reluctant to invest in that country.  On the 
other hand, when a country is more developed, larger in market capitalization, and has lower 
transaction costs, foreign investors are more likely to invest there.  Thus, the weight of 
cumulative research evidence suggests that contrary to economic theory, investor behavior is not 
entirely rational and that cultural factors affect investor rationality.   
Cultural factors play a role not only in the behavior of investors but also in the decisions 
of firms in terms of their activities in capital markets.  Dodd, Frijns and Gilbert (2013) found that 
firms cross-list in markets with greater cultural similarities, because investors are more willing to 
invest in culturally familiar firms and also because managers seek to avoid potential conflicts 
with culturally disparate investors and managers.  This is in line with an earlier finding by 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) who also found that cultural proximity plays an important role in the 
choice of a firm’s overseas listing venue.  In a study of international bond markets, it was found 
that greater cultural difference between U.S. investors and foreign issuers increases the cost of 
debt (Zhu and Cai, 2014).  Even a firm’s preference for short-term versus long-term debt has 
been empirically found to be related to cultural factors (Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kwok, 
2012).  Culture plays a role in the venture capital markets as well.  Nahata, Hazarika and Tandon 
(2014), for example, found that cultural distance between countries of the portfolio company and 
its lead investor positively affects VC success because cultural differences create incentives for 
rigorous ex ante screening, improving VC performance.  Even in informal capital markets 
culture is a significant factor.  A recent study by Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal (2014) found that 
online crowdfunding lenders prefer culturally similar and geographically proximate borrowers. 
 The functioning of capital markets is far more dependent on trust than product markets, 
making institutional perspective a particular powerful heuristic lens for theory building.  Because 
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quality of products can be verified reasonably accurately prior to purchase in the case of physical 
products, customers feel less need for trust.  In the absence of such easy verifiability, capital 
markets typically resort to a variety of mechanisms to make markets function.  One such 
mechanism is the creation of formal institutions that substitute for trust (Pevzner, Xie, and Xin, 
2015).   Another approach is for firms to engage in actions that signal trustworthiness.  But these 
approaches work only up to a point because the level of trust in society is to a great extent a 
cultural characteristic.  Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) found that level of trust is related to 
amount of trade, portfolio investment, and direct investment.  Lack of trust inevitably leads to an 
increase in transaction costs.   
Given the increasing recognition of the role of culture in determining the behavior of 
participants of capital markets, IB researchers need to pay greater attention to its implications for 
firm’s financing decisions in global capital markets.  Country specific factors could also play a 
key role in determining the capital structure of firms.  Indeed, the globalization of capital 
markets makes capital market choice and the choice of an appropriate capital structure even more 
complex because firms now seek capital from multiple capital markets with differing norms and 
regulations.   
4.6 Institutional distance, the role of technology, and regulatory arbitrage   
Despite the fact that technology has liberated modern finance from geography, geography 
still matters in a number of ways.  Modern financial markets cluster in a relatively small number 
of concentrated communities which in turn leads to a high level of social connectivity 
(Carruthers and Kim, 2011).  Together, geographic proximity and social connection result in 
herding and bandwagon behaviors as well as rapid diffusion of innovations and practices.  Social 
connectivity also plays a central role in the venture capital arena where much of the information 
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transfer takes place through informal channels facilitated by social connections.   It can be 
argued that integration of capital markets and the introduction of technology can potentially 
reduce the social texture of financial markets.  On the other hand, it is also possible that 
technology enables relationships to develop more easily across vast distances and that social 
connectivity can exist despite spatial separation.   
 The high spatial concentration of financial markets seems to have some implications for 
availability of capital to firms in the peripheries.  Klagge and Martin (2005) found that capital 
markets do not function in a space-neutral way and that dispersed markets such as in Germany 
are far more likely to fund small and medium enterprises than geographically concentrated 
markets such as UK.  If we generalize these results to global capital markets, it raises the 
possibility that firms coming from countries that are far removed from major financial centers 
may have less access to global markets even in an era of integrated capital markets. 
Ghemawat (2001) has made a strong argument that distance still matters.  He has also 
argued that distance needs to be conceptualized as multi-dimensional and not just as geographic 
distance.  Additional dimensions of distance may include cultural, economic, and administrative 
distance.  If pronouncements about the death of distance are indeed premature, it can be argued 
that potential for arbitrage still exists.  What integration of product markets did in the last few 
decades was to create greater possibilities for arbitrage because in the final analysis, all 
international trade is arbitrage across space.  According to this logic, integration of capital 
markets should also lead to similar additional possibilities for arbitrage.  That is, market 
integration does neither make distance irrelevant nor diminish possibilities for arbitrage.  
Ghemawat (2007) points out that contrary to public perception, even in our globalized economy, 
arbitrage is a source of both competitive advantage and above normal profits because both labor 
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and capital markets are specialized at the level of location.  Global capital markets indeed show a 
very high level of specialization. US capital markets, both venture capital and equity markets 
draw Israeli biotechnology companies because of their specialization in biotechnology.  
Similarly, London has a strong history of mining company listings.  Taiwan’s higher trading 
volume, liquidity and P/E ratios have led many overseas firms to list in that market. However, 
another important consideration has been Taiwan’s expertise in supply chains and R&D 
capabilities (Bell and Rasheed, 2016).  Specialization of capital markets, in turn, implies that 
firms have to make conscious choices about which markets to go to for raising equity and debt 
capital (Moore, Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012). 
From TCE perspective in Table 2, although arbitrage is mostly understood in terms of 
cost differences across spatial and temporal distances, the integration of capital markets also 
raises the possibility of ‘regulatory arbitrage’.  For example, capital markets around the world are 
subject to varying degrees of legal requirements relating to disclosure, shareholder protection 
and compliance.  Integration of capital markets are not accompanied by standardization of 
regulatory requirements across countries and this offers firms with an opportunity for regulatory 
arbitrage.  Firm responses to arbitrage opportunity can potentially go in two diametrically 
opposite directions.  First, there can be a “race to the bottom” whereby firms gravitate towards 
capital markets with minimal regulation and enforcements.  Second, firms can engage in 
“bonding”  (Coffee, 1999).  That is, they can choose to list their stocks in foreign exchanges with 
higher standards of investor protection and monitoring than their home markets (Bell, 
Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012).  Such listing can serve as a credible signal of better governance 
to investors and result in higher valuation.  Examination of the managerial choice process 
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between bonding and racing to the bottom and its implications for various stakeholder groups 
presents opportunities for additional research. 
 
5. Research on the implications of capital market integration for firm strategies 
The purpose of this Special Issue is to bring together the growing community of scholars 
in international business who are beginning to address the implications of capital market 
integration for firm strategies.  As large pools of capital are chasing investment opportunities 
around the world, managers have been able to greatly expand the options they have for sourcing 
capital.  The integration of product markets gave companies the options to expand their sales 
around the world in search of new markets in an earlier era.  Starting the 1980s, the global 
dispersion of the value chains of multinational firms in search of lower costs led to the 
globalization of production operations (Denk, Kaufmann, and Roesch, 2012).  The globalization 
of capital markets presents a new set of opportunities and challenges for managers of both 
multinational and domestic firms.  The contributions of researchers in this special issue clearly 
suggest that a growing number of IB researchers are beginning to explore the many research 
questions presented by the globalization of capital markets.  The articles in this issue explore 
issues relating to cost of capital, interrelationships among operational and financial strategies, 
international investments by SWFs, cross-listing of equity shares, and international venture 
capital.  
Lindorfer and d’Arcy (2016)’s study of foreign listing by European firms is an interesting 
addition to the literature on the interaction between product and capital markets. Their results 
suggest that managers do not make capital sourcing decisions solely based on cost of capital 
considerations.  Instead, choices about capital and product markets potentially influence each 
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other and evolve jointly.   Their finding that ex ante host-market operational activity influences 
the foreign-listing decision but that a foreign listing does not necessarily lead to higher ex-post 
host-market operational activity suggests that there is greater likelihood of financial spillover 
than operational spillover.  This asymmetry between financial and operational spillovers is 
intriguing, but not entirely surprising. It suggests the possibility that liabilities of foreignness in 
capital markets are higher than in product markets and prior operational presence can reduce 
some of the problems related to unfamiliarity.  
The paper by Lindner, Müllner and Puck (2016) investigates the role of institutional 
quality, institutional distance, and institutional dynamics in capital markets.  Their specific focus 
is on cost of debt, specifically the impact of FDI on a firm’s cost of debt.  By developing a 
framework of institutional influences and their interdependencies on the cost of debt, they 
demonstrate the relevance of the institutional perspective in financial markets.   Their results also 
suggest that in evaluating the costs and benefits of investment into a country, MNC managers 
need to take into consideration the impact it may have on the overall cost of the firm’s debt. 
SWFs are ushering in a new era of state capitalism, blurring the boundaries between 
finance and politics (Aguilera, Capapé, and Santiso, 2016).  Murtinu and Scalera’s (2016) paper 
sheds light on the somewhat opaque world of sovereign wealth funds and their investment 
strategies and is indicative of the growing research interest on the strategies followed by SWFs.  
Their analysis of SWFs is more fine-grained than prior studies because they distinguish between 
different types of investment vehicles and attempt to predict a firm’s choice among them by 
examining deal specific, SWF-specific and country-specific antecedents.   
Temouri, Driffield, and Bhaumik (2016) examine cross-listing by emerging market firms.  
Based on a sample drawn from Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa, they try to identify 
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the characteristics of firms that cross-list and evaluate the benefits they derive from cross-listing.  
Cross-listing is both a signaling and a bonding mechanism.  It signals that a firm is well governed 
and that it is willing to bond to the demands of a more developed market.  The study finds that the 
benefits of cross-listing are greater for informationally opaque firms and those that have incumbent 
foreign shareholders. Interestingly, it was found that the benefits from bonding decline with 
improvement in the quality of home institutions of the firms. 
The focus of Khavul and Deeds (2016) is on explaining how networks of actors develop in an 
emerging VC market, one in which both domestic and foreign VCs are active.  They explore how 
domestic and foreign VC syndicate partners select each other for their initial co-investment by 
examining observable economic and social signals, captured as investor experience and 
conferred status.  They find that in the absence of dense local networks, existing industry focused 
networks and overlapping knowledge bases become important in the decision of with whom a 
VC is going to co-invest. They also find evidence for path dependence in VC entry into an 
emerging VC market.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we have summarized the findings of the papers presented in this special issue and 
outlined an agenda for further research on the globalization of capital markets and its 
implications for theory building and empirical research in a number of areas of IB research. The 
articles contained in this special issue contribute to addressing some of these challenges but 
many other challenges remain. The analysis in this paper has identified a number of research 
questions and issues we believe are important because currently we do not have theoretically and 
empirically adequate answers to address them. While there have been important global 
developments in capital markets and finance, systematic research on the strategy and governance 
aspects of the international dimensions of factor markets remains under-developed. We have 
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identified a number of important themes that will both help our understanding and also provide 
an evidence base for policy-makers and regulators at both national and international levels. In 
conclusion, for the same reason that internationalization strategy practice pushes the frontier in 
strategic thinking, an integration between finance and IB research, both as an opportunity and as 
a necessity, is challenging conventional wisdom in academic thinking and theories. We are 
confident that a new generation of scholarship pursuing some of the future research questions 
outlined in this Special Issue will widen the trail blazed by the papers included here.     
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Table 1 Distinctive Characteristics of Product Market and Capital Markets 
 
 
                                             Distinctive Characteristics of Product Market and Capital Markets 
 
  Product Capital 
Informational Production 
Environments 
Dispersed  Concentrated  
Types of Goods Traded Consumption goods Investment goods 
Buyers and seller linkages Linkages until the point of sale Linkages beyond the point of sale 
Information Collection 
Intensity 
Collection at a single point in time Collection and dissemination is continual 
Information Frictions 
Similar to Capital market PLUS 
transportation and storage 
Transactions costs, taxes and regulations, 
asset indivisibility, and agency and 
information  
Source of Arbitrage Arbitrage in space Arbitrage in time 
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Table 2 Product Market and Capital Markets: Key Theory Frameworks 
 
 
                                    Globalization of markets and theory focus 
 
  
Product 
markets 
Capital 
markets 
 
Transaction Cost (TCE) 
 
Minimization of transaction costs; 
Internalization vs externalization  
 
Liquidity of the firm’s financial assets;  
Costs of capital 
 
Resource dependency 
theory (RDT) 
 
 
Resource orchestration and 
configuration; bargaining power of 
buyers and suppliers 
 
Choice of capital markets; 
Investors’ “home bias” 
Agency theory 
 
 
Headquarters/subsidiary relations; 
Agency problems of multi-point 
competition 
 
Adverse selection; 
Misappropriation of capital 
Institutional theory  
 
Effects of economic, cultural and 
institutional distances 
 
Differences in institutional logics of capital 
markets 
 
Knowledge based view 
 
 
Bounded rationality and bounded 
reliability 
 
 
 
Liability of foreignness in capital markets 
(CMLOF) 
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